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U.S. Unemployment Insurance: Progress and Prospects
[Editor’s Note: This article is the fifth in a series on “Research Questions for the New Millennium.” The series aims to identify research needed
to inform employment policy in the near future.]
The federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States was
established by provisions in the Social Security Act of 1935. Public acceptance of and political
initiative for the system emerged from the widespread hardship resulting from high unemployment
in the Great Depression. The original UI provisions aimed to partially reduce lost income for
involuntarily unemployed workers, to reduce the dispersal of skilled workers when employers
make temporary layoffs, to help maintain aggregate purchasing power during economic
downturns, and to prevent the breakdown of general labor standards during such periods.
As we enter the 21st century, the longest economic expansion since World War II is
continuing, and labor shortages are developing in many areas. In addition to meeting existing
obligations, the UI system faces an added list of challenges. This article offers a brief overview of
the UI system as it operates today and suggests topics for research which could inform the further
development of UI.
Eligibility and Benefits
Unemployment insurance is social insurance. It combines insurance principles with
considerations of social adequacy. UI is intended to partially replace lost earnings for involuntarily
unemployed persons with sufficient prior employment, who are able, available, and actively
seeking work.
As insurance, UI requires that premiums be paid in advance through employer taxes on
wages earned in the prior year. Initial eligibility requires that earnings in UI-covered employment
exceed a state-specified minimum. States usually require at least $1,000 in earnings, with a higher
level required for higher benefits.
Balancing social adequacy and work incentives, state laws provide that UI will replace
about one-half of prior wages, subject to a maximum and minimum, for up to 26 weeks. In 1999,
the weekly benefit amount averaged $200. During the past half-century, UI has replaced on
average one-third of lost wages (Table 1, column 1) among those who qualify for benefits.
Research suggests that UI payments slightly prolong unemployment spells. Evaluation of
strategies to improve reemployment incentives has informed the adoption of policies that target
job search workshops and self-employment assistance. Beginning in 1994, the Worker Profiling
and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system required special job search training for those
identified as being most likely to exhaust UI benefits. Lessons from WPRS can inform the
targeting of services at newly established one-stop career centers in workforce investment areas.
Table 1 Benefit and Financing Trends in the U.S. Federal-State UI System, for
             Selected Years 1938-1998
Year
(1)
Wage
replacement ratea
(%)
(2)
UI benefit
payments as a %
of GDP
(3)
Reserve ratiob
(%)
(4)
Average UI tax on
covered payrolls
(%)
1938 43.1 0.46 4.22 2.69
1943 33.6 0.03 7.13 1.86
1948 34.1 0.30 7.91 1.01
1953 32.3 0.26 6.41 0.93
1958 35.3 0.77 3.99 0.84
1963 34.6 0.46 2.88 1.34
1968 34.3 0.23 3.54 0.76
1973 36.1 0.30 2.13 0.99
1978 36.4 0.35 0.55 1.41
1983 37.2 0.52 0.00 1.20
1988 34.9 0.30 1.71 0.96
1993 36.0 0.34 1.25 0.90
1998 32.9 0.23 1.51 0.62
aWage replacement rate is the average UI weekly benefit amount divided by average weekly wage in UI 
covered employment.
bReserve ratio is accumulated holdings in UI benefit trust funds divided by total payrolls in UI covered 
employment x 100.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce. Su v y of Current Business. Wa hington, D.C. and U.S. Department 
of Labor. Unemployment Insurance Financial Data: ET Handbook No. 394. Washington, D.C.: Employment
and Training Administration.
The original focus of the UI system on prime-age, full-time workers in a labor surplus
economy remains largely unchanged to this day. However, in the current labor shortage situation,
broadened UI eligibility for part-time, contingent, and self-employed workers could increase labor
force participation and help ease tight labor markets. Research should investigate the financing
costs and effects of permitting continued UI eligibility for those only seeking return to part-time
work, as well as special reimbursable benefit arrangements for self-employed and contingent
workers.
The U.S. Department of Labor recently drafted regulations to allow states to use UI
reserves for paying benefits to households in which parents have chosen to take parental family
leave. This essentially expands UI eligibility to include beneficiaries who are not actively seeking
work. The impact of such expansions on the ability of the UI system to finance its core objectives
should be carefully evaluated.
Coverage and Recipiency
UI coverage has steadily
expanded over the years to
encompass virtually all full-time
permanent wage and salary workers
(Figure 1). Initially, only employers
with eight or more workers were
covered; that was relaxed to four
employees in 1954, and to one
employee in 1970. In the early
1970s, nonprofit firms and state and
local governments became covered.
As coverage steadily expanded, the
rate of UI recipiency gradually fell.
Beneficiaries now constitute only
about 35 percent of all unemployed
(Figure 1).
Even among those eligible for benefits, only about two-thirds bother to collect. In addition
to raising questions about social adequacy, low recipiency may weaken the counter cyclical
potential of the federal-state UI system. Increased UI recipiency has become a major objective of
the U.S. Department of Labor. UI has acted as an automatic stabilizer for the economy. In times
of recession, aggregate UI payments have risen to more than three-quarters of 1 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP), while automatically falling below one-quarter of 1 percent of GDP in
years of low unemployment (Table 1, column 2).
Over the years, the countercyclical effect of UI has frequently been supplemented by
temporary federal programs that extended benefits beyond 26 weeks. Following high
unemployment in the early 1980s, the federal government instituted a permanent, federally
funded, extended benefits program. Nonetheless, during the 1991 recession, another temporary
federal extended benefits program was enacted. Research about how to ideally structure and
finance an extended benefits program should continue.
Financing Benefits
UI was established through a federal tax levied on employer payrolls, with 90 percent of
the revenue returned to states that establish and operate UI programs consistent with
requirements in the federal law. There is wide variation among states in UI provisions, but all
comply with federal statute as monitored by the U.S. Department of Labor.
A key federal requirement is that taxes be experience-rated, meaning that tax rates move
in tandem with a firm’s layoffs and UI benefit charges. Research finds that when experience rating
operates without restriction, it acts to stabilize employment. However, tax rate maximums, mini-
mums, and time lags in tax adjustment weaken the response.
The benefit financing system is designed to minimize the tendency of UI taxes to reinforce
economic contractions. Reserves are replenished gradually by tax contributions after they are
drawn down by benefit payments. The most severe financial strain ever experienced by the system
occurred in 1975, when benefits totaled 2.2 percent of covered payrolls. From 1975 to 1987, total
system reserves never exceeded 1 percent of covered payrolls. By 1982, UI benefit trust funds
were completely exhausted (Table 1, column 3). The response among states was tightened
eligibility, which conserved funds but contributed to diminished recipiency rates.
Recent years have witnessed a slow and modest recovery in system-wide reserves. As a
proportion of total covered wages, UI taxes have hovered around 1 percent, being well below this
level in recent years after a long economic expansion (Table 1, column 4). There are no strong
incentives for states to provide significant forward financing of benefits, and the U.S. Department
of Labor is moving toward a first-time relaxation of reserve adequacy guidelines. Indeed, a few
states have moved to zero tax rates for employers having a positive balance. Research into the
effects of broadening the federal taxable wage base on each worker’s earnings from $7,000 per
year could help inform benefit finance policy.
Administration
Unemployment tax collections retained by the federal government are used to finance
program administration through grants to the states and to make loans to the states when liquidity
problems arise. Grants for administration are done by a formula based on workload factors such
as the number of UI claims, appeals, and covered employers.
UI tax receipts are held in the Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund (UTF), which is part
of the unified federal budget. Federal budget deficits through the late 1990s induced the federal
government to conserve funds, while the states claimed that federal holdings for administration
were state entitlements that should be distributed.
Research has suggested that to encourage high-quality service, efficient low-cost
administration, and continuous quality improvement, the administrative funding mechanism should
1) be based on the quality of service as measured through a simple monitoring system operated by
the federal partner to assess state practice, and 2) permit states to retain unspent financial grants.
Such a system should encourage UI taxpayers to monitor administrative efficiency, so as to
increase the share of administrative grants retained for other uses including benefit payments.
States have increasingly viewed the administration of UI as simply a disbursement
function. Federal quality control random audits identified failure to satisfy the “actively seeking
work” requirement (or “work test”) as the prime source of payment errors. States have improved
the timeliness and accuracy of payments, but to do so they have often weakened the work test
that linked UI to reemployment efforts of the public employment service.
Mechanisms to encourage return to work may be further weakened by telephone systems
for initial and continued UI claims. The use of such systems is expanding rapidly, and Internet-
based systems are appearing. Telephone claim systems could affect both entry to the UI system
and the duration of benefit receipt. These are important policy questions which are now just
beginning to receive research attention.
Conclusion
Given the present and likely future labor shortages facing U.S. employers, additional
changes in UI that promote reemployment and labor force participation should be studied. Added
labor supply might be forthcoming if eligibility conditions were changed to permit UI access for
part-time, part-year, and self-employed workers. Research suggests that labor force participation
for all these groups is more responsive to UI entitlement than that for prime-age wage and salary
workers.
A severe recession has not tested UI financing and claims processing capacity in nearly 20
years. In preparing for the inevitable next recession, the issue is not only the adequacy of UI
reserves, but the sufficiency of telephone claims and other UI administrative mechanisms in the
new one-stop environment for public employment services.
Since it was first established, the federal-state UI system has provided income replacement
for millions of jobless workers and security for countless others who succeeded in the labor
market knowing they had earnings insurance to fall back on. UI has become such an integral part
of workplace decisions that it is taken for granted. The narrow aim of providing income security
for workers is a crucial one. Achieving this at minimal cost of forgone private investment is a
huge challenge. As a wealthy society, we may collectively choose to pursue other goals. We
should also recognize that the narrowly focused and self-financed UI system has served its
function well.
Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the Upjohn Institute.
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